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NOTES 
FAITHLESS ELECTORS:  KEEPING THE TIES 
THAT BIND 
Scott Eckl* 
 
Every four years, the United States chooses a president and vice president.  
Millions of Americans exercise the right to vote, believing that they are voting 
for the candidates of their choice.  In actuality, 538 relatively unknown party 
insiders known as electors officially choose the president a month later in 
fifty-one obscure meetings.  Most of the time, these electors mirror the 
popular votes.  However, whether these electors are required to do so and 
whether the states can enforce laws requiring them to do so are open 
questions.  The Tenth Circuit recently declared statutes that bind electors 
unconstitutional.  A few months before that decision, the Washington State 
Supreme Court ruled that these laws and their enforceability are 
constitutional.  This Note identifies the arguments for each position, analyzes 
the strengths and weaknesses of each position, and identifies any issues not 
considered either by legal scholars or by the courts.  Finally, this Note agrees 
with the Washington State Supreme Court that these laws are constitutional 
and implores the U.S. Supreme Court to affirm the Washington State 
Supreme Court’s decision in June 2020 before one of those 538 electors can 
change the outcome of a future presidential election. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Following the November 2016 presidential election, U.S. citizens outraged 
by the result led an unprecedented campaign to pressure electors to vote for 
someone other than two major party nominees, Donald Trump and Hillary 
Clinton.1  Many Republican electors reported receiving “tens of thousands” 
 
 1. See Gabriel Debenedetti & Kyle Cheney, Progressive Groups Plan to Protest 
Electoral College Vote, POLITICO (Dec. 7, 2016), https://www.politico.com/story/2016/ 
12/electoral-college-vote-protests-232311 [https://perma.cc/XTX7-77DY]. 
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of emails pleading them to vote for someone other than Trump.2  One 
Republican elector in Michigan reported that he received “cardboard trays 
full of letters asking [him] not to vote for the person the people of the state 
of Michigan chose.”3  Some Democratic electors, in an effort to stop Trump 
from becoming president, advocated voting for another Republican in the 
hopes that Republican electors would join them.4 
In the official tally, seven electors defected and voted for a candidate other 
than Donald Trump or Hillary Clinton.5  Two states, Colorado and 
Washington, chose to enforce their laws against these “faithless electors,” 
which prompted litigation challenging the constitutionality of these laws 
under the Twelfth Amendment.6  With little U.S. Supreme Court precedent 
on the issue, the litigation resulted in contradictory rulings.7  In In re Guerra,8 
the Washington State Supreme Court ruled that these laws are constitutional.9  
Conversely, in Baca v. Colorado Department of State,10 the Tenth Circuit 
ruled that these laws are unconstitutional.11  The electors in the Washington 
case and the state in the Colorado case have appealed to the Supreme Court,12 
 
 2. See id. 
 3. Chad Livengood, Trump’s Michigan Electors Endure Deluge of Threats, Lobbying to 
Change Votes, DET. NEWS (Dec. 18, 2016), https://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/politics/ 
2016/12/18/mich-electors/95601280/ [https://perma.cc/5CM6-UQEA]. 
 4. One Washington elector explained that her defection meant “casting [her] electoral 
college ballot not for Clinton, who won [her] state of Washington, but for a compromise 
Republican candidate who other Republican electors can rally around to stop Trump getting 
elected.” Ed Pilkington, ‘Faithless Electors’ Explain Their Last-Ditch Attempt to Stop Donald 
Trump, GUARDIAN (Dec. 19, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/dec/19/ 
electoral-college-faithless-electors-donald-trump [https://perma.cc/R63U-QH9Z]. 
 5. See Kiersten Schmidt & Wilson Andrews, A Historic Number of Electors Defected, 
and Most Were Supposed to Vote for Clinton, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/12/19/us/elections/electoral-college-results.html 
[https://perma.cc/7UG9-VV2T].  Two Texas Republican electors voted for Ron Paul and John 
Kasich, respectively; one Hawaii Democratic elector voted for Bernie Sanders; three 
Washington Democratic electors voted for Colin Powell and one voted for Faith Spotted 
Eagle. Id.  Three other electors in Colorado, Maine, and Minnesota attempted to vote for 
someone other than their party’s nominee but either changed their minds or were forced out 
by their states. See id. 
 6. See Baca v. Colo. Dep’t of State, 935 F.3d 887, 902 (10th Cir. 2019), cert. granted, 
140 S. Ct. 918 (Jan. 17, 2020) (No. 19-518) (mem.); In re Guerra, 441 P.3d 807, 808 (Wash. 
2019), cert. granted sub nom. Chiafalo v. Washington, 140 S. Ct. 918 (Jan. 17, 2020) (No. 19-
465) (mem.); see also U.S. CONST. amend. XII. 
 7. Though they came to different conclusions, both the Washington State Supreme Court 
and the Tenth Circuit relied heavily on the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Ray v. Blair, 343 
U.S. 214 (1952), which held that party pledges in primaries were constitutional. 
 8.  441 P.3d 807 (Wash. 2019), cert. granted sub nom. Chiafalo v. Washington, 140 S. 
Ct. 918 (Jan. 17, 2020) (No. 19-465) (mem.). 
 9. See id. at 808. 
 10. 935 F.3d 887 (10th Cir. 2019), cert. granted, 140 S. Ct. 918 (Jan. 17, 2020) (No. 19-
518) (mem.). 
 11. See id. at 902. 
 12. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 3, Chiafalo v. Washington, 140 S. Ct. 918 (2020) 
(No. 19-465), 2020 WL 254167. 
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which will hear the case on April 28, 2020, and should issue a decision on 
June 29, 2020.13 
The seven faithless votes in 2016 did not alter the election.14  But these 
votes, the contradictory rulings, and the looming 2020 election have 
reinvigorated a debate about the Electoral College.15  Since the Supreme 
Court has yet to definitively address the issue of binding electors, many states 
have enacted their own laws.16  Thirty-two states and the District of 
Columbia have laws, known as binding statutes, prohibiting elector 
discretion but seventeen of those states do not prescribe any consequence for 
an elector who deviates from the law.17  Absent a clear Supreme Court ruling 
or a constitutional amendment, the law on this issue will remain inconsistent. 
Part I of this Note discusses the structure of the Electoral College, as 
described in Article II and the Twelfth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.  
It then briefly discusses the history of the Electoral College, binding statutes, 
and faithless electors.  Finally, it discusses the jurisprudence relevant to a 
state’s authority to bind its electors.  Part II outlines the opposing viewpoints 
on the constitutionality of elector independence and states’ authority to 
impose binding statutes.  Part III argues that binding statutes are 
constitutional and discusses the positive and negative effects that the 
upcoming Supreme Court ruling could have on the issue and on future 
elections. 
I.  THE SMOKE-FILLED ROOM:  THE BIRTH OF A CONTROVERSIAL SYSTEM 
AND HOW IT HAS BEEN USED AND INTERPRETED THROUGHOUT HISTORY 
The Electoral College was highly controversial during the Constitutional 
Convention and has been throughout U.S. history.  This Part discusses the 
structure of the Electoral College.  It discusses the founders’ original intent 
for the Electoral College, the history of the Electoral College, and the 
enactment of the Twelfth Amendment.  It also discusses faithless electors 
 
 13. See Justices to Consider Faithless Electors, Ahead of 2020 Vote, POLITICO (Jan. 17, 
2020), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/01/17/justices-to-consider-faithless-electors-
ahead-of-2020-vote-100631 [https://perma.cc/Z7DT-WWWX].  These dates may, however, 
change as the Court responds to the COVID-19 outbreak. See Press Release, U.S. Supreme 
Court, Postponement of March Oral Arguments (Mar. 16, 2020), https:// 
www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/press/pressreleases/pr_03-16-20 [https://perma.cc/4T9S-
N6UE] (announcing postponement of oral arguments scheduled in March and early April due 
to the coronavirus outbreak). 
 14. See Presidential Election Results:  Donald Trump Wins, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 9, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/elections/2016/results/president [https://perma.cc/2PKE-MFTB]. 
 15. See Editorial, Fix the Electoral College—or Scrap It, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 30, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/30/opinion/electoral-college.html [https://perma.cc/ 
N9Q2-DXGY]. 
 16. See Jim Brunner, Four Washington State Electors Break Ranks and Don’t Vote for 
Clinton, SEATTLE TIMES (Dec. 19, 2016), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/politics/ 
four-washington-electors-break-ranks-and-dont-vote-for-clinton/ [https://perma.cc/E8T7-
YQPW]. 
 17. See Electoral College:  Faithless Elector State Laws, FAIR VOTE, https:// 
www.fairvote.org/the_electoral_college#faithless_electors [https://perma.cc/Y725-BDKQ] 
(last visited Mar. 17, 2020). 
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and actions by states and political parties to control them.  Finally, it 
discusses how the courts have interpreted the electors’ roles and states’ 
authority to control them. 
A.  What Is the Electoral College? 
The Electoral College, created by the Constitution, is composed of a group 
of people called electors who officially vote for our country’s president and 
vice president.18  Each state contributes a certain number of electors to this 
group based on the state’s number of congressional representatives.19 
On Election Day, people vote for electors—not for the presidential or vice-
presidential candidates.20  Article II, Section 1 of the Constitution, as 
amended by the Twelfth Amendment, sets the formal process for electing the 
president.21  First, each state appoints its designated number of electors.22  
Then, the electors across the country meet on the same day in their respective 
states to cast their votes for president and vice president.23  Originally, the 
Constitution required the electors to vote for two candidates for president:  
the candidate with the highest number of votes would become president and 
the next runner-up would become vice president.24  The Twelfth 
Amendment, however, changed this so that the electors would vote 
separately for president and vice president.25  The presidential candidate with 
the most votes becomes president if the number of votes constitutes a 
majority of the electors.26 
 
 18. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.  The term “Electoral College” does not appear anywhere 
in the Constitution. See JOHN R. KOZA ET AL., EVERY VOTE EQUAL:  A STATE-BASED PLAN FOR 
ELECTING THE PRESIDENT BY NATIONAL POPULAR VOTE 2 (4th ed. 2013). 
 19. “Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a 
Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which the 
State may be entitled in the Congress.” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2, amended by U.S. CONST. 
amend. XII.  There are 538 electors, derived from the total number of senators (100), the total 
number of members of the House of Representatives (435), and three additional members from 
the District of Columbia. See Distribution of Electoral Votes, NAT’L ARCHIVES, 
https://www.archives.gov/federal-register/electoral-college/allocation.html 
[https://perma.cc/GN9V-T7A2] (last visited Mar. 17, 2020). 
 20. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XII. 
 21. See id. 
 22. See id.; see also 3 U.S.C. § 1 (2018) (“The electors . . . shall be appointed . . . on the 
Tuesday next after the first Monday in November . . . .”). 
 23. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XII; see also 3 U.S.C. 
§ 7 (“The electors . . . shall meet and give their votes on the first Monday after the second 
Wednesday in December . . . .”). 
 24. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 3, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XII.  The two 
candidates must be from different states. See id. The “inhabitancy rule” satisfied some 
framers’ worries about regionalism and encouraged electors to adopt a more national outlook. 
See Jerry H. Goldfeder, Election Law and the Presidency:  An Introduction and Overview, 85 
FORDHAM L. REV. 965, 972 n.44 (2016). 
 25. See U.S. CONST. amend. XII. 
 26. If no presidential candidate receives a majority of the electoral votes, then the election 
is thrown to the House of Representatives, where each state gets one vote. See id. If the vice-
presidential candidate does not receive a majority of the electoral votes, the election is thrown 
to the Senate. See id. 
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The Constitution is silent as to who can be an elector, except that it 
explicitly states that electors cannot be senators or representatives or 
someone “holding an Office of Trust or Profit under the United States.”27  
Currently, most states allow political parties to choose a slate of electors to 
represent their respective candidates.28  State laws vary as to how a political 
party chooses its specific electors.29  These electors generally remain 
unknown to the public because the “short-form” ballot only contains the 
names of the candidates for president and vice president.30  In every state, a 
vote for the candidate of that particular party is a vote for that party’s slate of 
electors.31 
B.  The Constitutional Convention’s Understanding of the Electoral College 
and the Subsequent Ratification of the Twelfth Amendment 
Selecting the process that would choose the president was one of the more 
elaborate debates among the fifty-five delegates to the 1787 Constitutional 
Convention.32  The framers wanted to give the people a voice after first 
rejecting a proposal to have Congress appoint the president.33  After several 
weeks of debating between a popular vote and an electoral system, the 
framers created a “Committee of Eleven” (one delegate per state) to resolve 
the issue.34  This committee drafted the plan that resembles the Electoral 
College used today.35 
In The Federalist Papers, Alexander Hamilton defended the Electoral 
College and advocated for its ratification.36  The electors were to be “men 
most capable of analyzing the qualities adapted to the station” and “most 
likely to possess the information and discernment requisite to so complicated 
 
 27. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XII.  In 1876, for 
example, a postmaster in Oregon resigned so that he could be eligible to serve as an elector. 
See ROBERT W. BENNETT, TAMING THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE 32 (2006). 
 28. See Distribution of Electoral Votes, supra note 19. 
 29. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-4-502(2) (2020) (by state convention); N.Y. ELEC. 
LAW § 6-102 (McKinney 2020) (by state committee); 25 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2878 (2020) (by 
party presidential nominee); WIS. STAT. § 8.18 (2020) (by party nominees for state 
legislature). 
 30. See BENNETT, supra note 27, at 2. 
 31. See, e.g., N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 12-100 (“Each vote cast for the candidates of any 
party . . . for president and vice president of the United States . . . shall be deemed to be cast 
for the candidates for elector of such party . . . .”). 
 32. See 2 JOSEPH L. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 1411 (Boston, Charles C. Little & James Brown 1851). 
 33. See id. § 1456. 
 34. See John D. Feerick, The Electoral College—Why It Ought to Be Abolished, 37 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 8 (1968). 
 35. See BRIAN L. FIFE, REFORMING THE ELECTORAL PROCESS IN AMERICA:  TOWARD MORE 
DEMOCRACY IN THE 21ST CENTURY 83–84 (2010).  As one political scientist who summarized 
the proceedings stated:  “Every solution seemed worse than the rest.  The arrangement they 
finally cobbled together at the last minute was adopted more out of desperation, perhaps, than 
out of any great confidence in its success.” Id. at 84.  The plan passed by a vote of nine to two. 
Id. at 83–84. 
 36. See TADAHISA KURODA, THE ORIGINS OF THE TWELFTH AMENDMENT:  THE ELECTORAL 
COLLEGE IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC, 1787–1804, at 17 (1994). 
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an investigation.”37  They were to “enter upon the task, free from any sinister 
bias.”38  Hamilton further wrote that this process would guarantee that the 
president “will seldom fall to the lot of any man who is not in an eminent 
degree endowed with the requisite qualifications.”39 
There was little debate during the convention on the exact role of the 
electors.40  Some argued that “[t]he Electors will be strangers to the several 
candidates and of course unable to decide on their comparative merits.”41  
Further references to the role of electors and their contemplated 
independence, however, are found in The Federalist Papers, particularly 
Hamilton’s Federalist No. 68.42 
After the country’s first two contested elections, in 1796 and 1800, 
Congress felt the need to amend Article II.43  The original provision allowed 
electors to vote for two people for president, which resulted in pairing 
political rivals as president and vice president.44  The provision also allowed 
the House of Representatives, when no presidential candidate received a 
majority of the electoral vote, to choose among the top five candidates.45  
Because of this provision, Congress went through thirty-six rounds of voting 
in 1800.46  The differing procedures that the states used to appoint the 
electors47 and the rise of political parties had drastically altered the system 
envisioned by the framers.48 
The Twelfth Amendment addressed some of these flaws by simplifying 
the process, requiring presidential electors to vote separately for president 
and vice president.49  The 1804 ratification of the Twelfth Amendment 
represents the most significant constitutional change to the Electoral 
College.50 
 
 37. THE FEDERALIST NO. 68, at 410 (Alexander Hamilton) (E. H. Scott ed., 1898). 
 38. Id. at 411. 
 39. Id. at 412. 
 40. See Feerick, supra note 34, at 9 n.44. 
 41. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 501 (Max Farrand ed., rev. 
ed. 1937). 
 42. See generally THE FEDERALIST NO. 68, supra note 37. 
 43. See KURODA, supra note 36, at 110–14. 
 44. Some Federalist-leaning electors only voted for John Adams for president to assure 
an Adams presidency.  This tactic, however, resulted in the odd pairing of the Federalist 
Adams and Democratic-Republican Thomas Jefferson for vice president. See id. at 65–66. 
 45. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XII. 
 46. NEAL R. PEIRCE & LAWRENCE D. LONGLEY, THE PEOPLE’S PRESIDENT:  THE 
ELECTORAL COLLEGE IN AMERICAN HISTORY AND THE DIRECT VOTE ALTERNATIVE 40 (1981). 
 47. See id. at 247.  In 1796, legislatures in seven states directly selected electors and six 
states chose electors by popular vote. See id.  In 1800, legislatures in ten states directly selected 
electors and five states chose electors by popular vote. See id. 
 48. See id. at 41. 
 49. Additionally, if the election was thrown to the House, the Twelfth Amendment 
required the House to pick from the top three electoral vote-getters. See U.S. CONST. amend. 
XII. 
 50. See Baca v. Colo. Dep’t of State, 935 F.3d 887, 947–49 (10th Cir. 2019), cert. granted, 
140 S. Ct. 918 (Jan. 17, 2020) (No. 19-518) (mem.) (describing the history of the Electoral 
College).  The Twenty-Third Amendment granted the District of Columbia the number of 
electors equal to that of the least populous state. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXIII. 
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C.  What Does the Electoral College Look like Today? 
Political parties play the largest role in determining the electors.51  
Notably, the Constitution does not mention—and in fact sought to avoid—
the influence of political parties.52  Political parties, however, began to form 
almost immediately during George Washington’s administration and became 
more prominent after Washington declined to seek a third term.53  In the 1796 
election, state political parties began securing pledges from their electors.54  
Since that election, electors have mostly been party loyalists who have taken 
some pledge or oath to support their party’s nominees.55  In 2020, thirty-two 
states and the District of Columbia legally require elector candidates to sign 
a pledge.56  These pledges and the consequences for breaking them differ 
among the states.57 
While some states do not impose any penalties for breaking a pledge, other 
states impose penalties of varying degrees.  Seventeen states58 and the 
District of Columbia59 have laws that bind electors without providing for any 
enforcement.60  Eleven states have laws that cancel the elector’s vote and 
replace the elector.61  Two states impose a penalty on the elector but record 
 
 51. Robert M. Alexander, Lobbying the Electoral College:  The Potential for Chaos, in 
ELECTORAL COLLEGE REFORM:  CHALLENGES AND POSSIBILITIES 159, 164–65 (Gary Bugh ed., 
2010). 
 52. See BENNETT, supra note 27, at 20. 
 53. See id. at 21. 
 54. See Alexander, supra note 51, at 164. 
 55. See Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 229 n.16 (1952). 
 56. See Electoral College, supra note 17. 
 57. See Distribution of Electoral Votes, supra note 19.  Unpledged electors—those 
without either a binding state law or a party pledge—ceased to exist after the 1800 election, 
only to reappear again in 1960 when slates of unpledged electors won in Southern states in 
opposition to the Democrats’ support for civil rights initiatives. See Feerick, supra note 34, at 
21. 
 58. These states are Alabama, Alaska, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, 
Hawaii, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Ohio, Oregon, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, 
Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See Electoral College, supra note 17. 
 59. See D.C. CODE § 1-1001.08(g) (2020). 
 60. Three states—California, Hawaii, and Wisconsin—have language in their binding 
statutes that restrict their electors to voting for their party’s candidate “if both candidates are 
alive.” See, e.g., CAL. ELEC. CODE § 6906 (West 2020); see also Zachary J. Shapiro, Note, 
Free Agency:  The Constitutionality of Methods That Influence a Presidential Elector’s Ability 
to Exercise Personal Judgment, 26 CARDOZO J.L. & POL’Y 395, 422–24 (2018).  This language 
allows some discretion in a scenario where a candidate dies after the November election day 
but before the December meeting date. Shapiro, supra, at 422–24.  National parties have 
contingencies in place if a death occurs, but electors may not feel obligated to vote for that 
nominee. See id.  This has happened twice in history. See Feerick, supra note 34, at 23–24. 
 61. These states are Arizona, Colorado, Maine, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, 
Nebraska, Nevada, Utah, and Washington. See Electoral College, supra note 17.  In 2016, 
Washington imposed a fine of $1000. See In re Guerra, 441 P.3d 807, 808 (Wash. 2019), cert. 
granted sub nom. Chiafalo v. Washington, 140 S. Ct. 918 (Jan. 17, 2020) (No. 19-465) (mem.).  
In June 2019, the state legislature repealed that law and replaced it with one that does not 
impose a monetary penalty but replaces the faithless elector and fails to count their vote. See 
WASH. REV. CODE § 29A.56.330 (repealed 2019). 
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the vote as cast.62  Two states impose a penalty on the elector and cancel the 
vote.63 
An elector who abstains or votes contrary to their pledge and their state’s 
laws may be called a “faithless elector.”64  A recent estimate indicates that, 
in the history of presidential elections, there have been 167 faithless electors 
whose votes were officially counted.65  These electors’ votes deviated for 
various reasons,66 but none of their votes affected the outcome of an 
election.67  After a long hiatus, ten of the last eighteen elections had at least 
one faithless elector.68  In 2016, there were seven faithless electors.69  This 
marked the greatest number of faithless electors in an election since 1872.70  
While the Supreme Court has occasionally heard elector-related cases, there 
is no established legal doctrine regarding faithless electors in general 
elections. 
D.  The Legal Status of Presidential Electors 
Presidential electors serve a somewhat limited federal function.  In 
Burroughs v. United States,71 the Court ruled that “presidential electors are 
not officers or agents of the federal government, [but] they exercise federal 
functions under, and discharge duties in virtue of authority conferred by, the 
Constitution.”72  The Court implied that the exercise of this federal function 
 
 62. See Electoral College, supra note 17.  These states, New Mexico and South Carolina, 
allow the government to bring a criminal action against the elector. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1-
15-9 (2020); S.C. CODE ANN. § 7-19-80 (2020). 
 63. These states are Oklahoma, which imposes a fine and holds the elector guilty of a 
misdemeanor, and North Carolina, which imposes a $500 fine. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-
212 (2020); OKLA. STAT. tit. 26, § 10-109 (2020). 
 64. See BENNETT, supra note 27, at 95.  Scholars who believe that the Constitution 
originally intended electors to exercise independent judgment consider the term ironic because 
the “faithlessness” exhibited is only to their pledges and not to the Constitution itself. Id. at 
96. 
 65. See Electoral College, supra note 17. 
 66. See id.  Electors have cast seventy-one faithless votes for candidates who died after 
the November election day but before the electors met in December. Id.  Twenty-nine electors 
have abstained or have cast an abnormal vote. Id.  Sixty-seven have voted for a different 
candidate altogether on their own initiative. Id. 
 67. See BENNETT, supra note 27, at 98. 
 68. See Alexander, supra note 51, at 161; see also Electoral College, supra note 17.  
Faithless electors have been recorded in the elections of 1948, 1956, 1960, 1968, 1972, 1976, 
1988, 2000, 2004, and 2016. Electoral College, supra note 17. 
 69. It could have been ten but three were either disqualified or changed their votes. See 
Schmidt & Andrews, supra note 5. 
 70. See Electoral College, supra note 17.  In 1872, sixty-three Democratic electors voted 
for someone other than their nominee, Horace Greeley, because he died after the November 
election day but before the Electoral College meeting. Id. 
 71. 290 U.S. 534 (1934). 
 72. See id. at 545 (citation omitted); see also In re Green, 134 U.S. 377, 379 (1890) 
(“[Electors] are no more officers or agents of the United States than are the members of the 
state legislatures when acting as electors of federal senators, or the people of the States when 
acting as electors of representatives in Congress.”). 
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would not be immune from the federal government’s interest in keeping an 
election free from corruption.73 
In exercising this federal function, electors act within the authority of the 
states, which have “plenary power” over appointing electors.74  In 
McPherson v. Blacker,75 the Court recognized that the Constitution does not 
provide the exact method of appointing electors, but it “leaves it to the [state] 
legislature exclusively to define the method.”76  The Court suggested that 
historical practices and practical implications allow for a more flexible 
interpretation of the Twelfth Amendment, granting states this autonomy.77 
The Court has continued to rely on the Electoral College’s history and its 
practical implications in granting states more authority.78  In Ray v. Blair,79 
the Court declared that “[t]his long-continued practical interpretation of the 
constitutional propriety of an implied or oral pledge . . . weighs heavily in 
considering the constitutionality of a pledge.”80  The Court later admitted that 
while “[t]he individual citizen has no federal constitutional right to vote for 
electors,” “[h]istory has now favored the voter, and in each of the several 
States the citizens themselves vote for Presidential electors.”81  The Court 
has acknowledged that citizens have a constitutional right to vote for the 
president when “the state legislature chooses a statewide election as the 
means to implement its power to appoint members of the electoral college” 
and that such “right to vote as the legislature has prescribed is 
fundamental.”82 
The Court, however, has yet to explicitly address whether such long-
standing historical practice eliminates elector independence in general 
elections.  In Ray, the Court addressed an Alabama Democratic Party rule 
requiring elector candidates in primaries to sign a pledge to support the 
party’s nominees.83  Edmund Blair, an otherwise qualified electoral 
candidate, refused to sign the pledge and thus the party refused to certify his 
candidacy.84  In a narrow ruling, the Court reasoned that no provision in the 
 
 73. See Burroughs, 290 U.S. at 546–47. 
 74. McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 35 (1892). 
 75. 146 U.S. 1 (1892). 
 76. Id. at 27. 
 77. See id. at 36 (“But we can perceive no reason for holding that the power confided to 
the States by the Constitution has ceased to exist because the operation of the system has not 
fully realized the hopes of those by whom it was created.”); see also Williams v. Rhodes, 393 
U.S. 23, 29 (1968) (declaring that, so long as no other provision in the Constitution is violated, 
“[Article II, § 1] does grant extensive power to the States to pass laws regulating the selection 
of electors”). 
 78. See Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 229–30 (1952). 
 79. 343 U.S. 214 (1952). 
 80. Id. at 229–30 (“However, even if such promises of candidates . . . are legally 
unenforceable because violative of an assumed constitutional freedom of the elector . . . it 
would not follow that the requirement of a pledge in the primary is unconstitutional.”). Id. at 
230. 
 81. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000). 
 82. Id. 
 83. See Ray, 343 U.S. at 215. 
 84. See id. 
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Constitution barred a political party, in a primary for its electors, from 
requiring pledges to support its nominees.85  The Court reasoned that 
involvement in a party is voluntary and thus one must comply with the party’s 
rules.86  Justice Robert Jackson, however, observed in his dissent that the 
framers intended electors to be “free agents” who would “exercise an 
independent and nonpartisan judgment.”87  In rejecting the majority’s 
emphasis on historical practices, Justice Jackson reasoned that the Court 
could not use custom to amend the Constitution.88 
The Court’s ruling in Ray, which was limited to primary elections,89 left 
state and federal courts to address the issue in the context of general elections.  
Before 2016, state courts in California,90 Nebraska,91 and New York,92 as 
well as a federal district court in Michigan,93 ruled that binding statutes in 
general elections were constitutional.  State courts in Alabama,94 Kansas,95 
and Ohio,96 however, ruled that states could not restrict elector 
independence. 
The question left unaddressed in Ray regarding pledges in general 
elections and the faithless votes in the 2016 election prompted litigation in 
four jurisdictions.  Three Washington electors voted contrary to their pledges 
to vote for Hillary Clinton.97  Under state law at the time, the Washington 
secretary of state fined them each $1000 for failing to uphold their pledge.98  
The three electors took their case all the way to the Supreme Court of 
Washington, arguing that the law and the fine imposed were 
 
 85. See id. at 231. 
 86. See id. at 230. 
 87. Id. at 232 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
 88. See id. at 233.  Justice Jackson further advocated for abolishing the whole system 
altogether and instituting a direct popular vote for president. See id. at 234. 
 89. See id. at 231 (majority opinion). 
 90. Spreckels v. Graham, 228 P. 1040, 1045 (Cal. 1924) (declaring that electors use no 
judgment or discretion). 
 91. State ex rel. Neb. Republican State Cent. Comm. v. Wait, 138 N.W. 159, 165 (Neb. 
1912) (suggesting that states had the right to remove electors if they violated pledges because 
voters vote for “entire strangers” and a faithless vote “would be repugnant to every sense of 
honor”). 
 92. Thomas v. Cohen, 262 N.Y.S. 320, 331 (Sup. Ct. 1933) (ruling that short-form ballots, 
party primaries, and nominating conventions have drastically changed the presidential election 
process and positing that the Twelfth Amendment would have been written differently if these 
present-day conditions had existed at the time). 
 93. Gelineau v. Johnson, 904 F. Supp. 2d 742, 748 (W.D. Mich. 2012) (assuming that Ray 
strongly suggested that a state’s enforcement of a pledge would be constitutional). 
 94. Op. of the Justices, 34 So. 2d 598, 599–600 (Ala. 1948) (believing that the 
Constitution’s language clearly indicates that electors can exercise judgment).  However, this 
was an advisory opinion issued before the Supreme Court’s decision in Ray. 
 95. Breidenthal v. Edwards, 46 P. 469, 470 (Kan. 1896) (affirming the position that 
electors are under no legal obligation to uphold their party’s pledges). 
 96. State ex rel. Beck v. Hummel, 80 N.E.2d 899, 908–09 (Ohio 1948) (suggesting that 
pledges are only enforced by a moral obligation, not a legal one). 
 97. See In re Guerra, 441 P.3d 807, 808 (Wash. 2019), cert. granted sub nom. Chiafalo v. 
Washington, 140 S. Ct. 918 (Jan. 17, 2020) (No. 19-465) (mem.). 
 98. See id. 
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unconstitutional.99  The court ruled against them and declared the law and 
the fine constitutional.100  Electors in California and Minnesota also 
challenged their states’ laws, but the courts in those states denied the electors’ 
proposed preliminary injunctions, which would have precluded the states 
from certifying ballots that complied with the states’ binding statutes.101 
In Colorado, one faithless elector voted contrary to his pledge to vote for 
Hillary Clinton.102  After failing to obtain an injunction against the state, the 
state removed him, cancelled his vote, and replaced him with an elector who 
voted for Hillary Clinton.103  He sued the state, but the district court ruled 
that Colorado’s binding statute was constitutional and the state’s actions were 
permissible.104  The Tenth Circuit, however, reversed that decision and 
became the first court to expressly rule that a state’s binding statute was 
unconstitutional.105 
II.  A STATE OF BATTLEGROUND:  ELECTOR INDEPENDENCE VERSUS STATE 
AUTHORITY 
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Ray, the long-standing state practice of 
having binding statutes requiring electors to vote for the candidate who won 
the state’s popular vote, and electors’ historical adherence to these statutes 
suggest universal acceptance of the statutes’ constitutionality.  Indeed, until 
the Tenth Circuit’s decision, no court has ever explicitly declared a binding 
statute unconstitutional.106  However, the Tenth Circuit’s decision and the 
Washington State Supreme Court’s contradictory ruling have revived the 
issue. 
This Part discusses the legal issues of elector independence and binding 
statutes in light of Baca v. Colorado Department of State.  It discusses 
arguments raised by the Tenth Circuit, the parties in the litigation, and other 
courts and legal scholars that binding statutes are unconstitutional.  It then 
outlines the arguments raised by the Washington State Supreme Court and 
other courts and scholars that binding statutes are constitutional.  Finally, it 
explores the text of the Constitution, the framers’ intent, and electors’ roles 
and historical practices. 
 
 99. See id. 
 100. See id. at 807. 
 101. See Abdurrahman v. Dayton, No. 16-cv-4279 (PAM/HB), 2016 WL 7428193, at *2–
4 (D. Minn. Dec. 23, 2016); Koller v. Brown, 224 F. Supp. 3d 871, 874 (N.D. Cal. 2016).  
 102. See Baca v. Colo. Dep’t of State, 935 F.3d 887, 902–03 (10th Cir. 2019), cert. granted, 
140 S. Ct. 918 (Jan. 17, 2020) (No. 19-518) (mem.). 
 103. See id. at 904. 
 104. See id. at 901–05. 
 105. See id. at 956. 
 106. See supra Part I.D. 
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A.  The Unconstitutionality of Binding Statutes 
When interpreting the Constitution, the Supreme Court first looks at the 
text.107  The Court has, however, afforded considerable weight to 
governmental and historical practices when the issue concerns “the 
respective powers of those who are equally the representatives of the 
people.”108  The Constitution should be “understood by the voters; its words 
and phrases were used in their normal and ordinary as distinguished from 
technical meaning.”109  This section discusses the arguments that binding 
statutes are unconstitutional because they are contradictory to the plain 
language of the Twelfth Amendment and to the framers’ original intent.  It 
also discusses how, historically, electors have been understood to be 
independent. 
1.  The Twelfth Amendment’s Language Prohibits States from Controlling 
Electors 
According to the Tenth Circuit in Baca, the language of the Twelfth 
Amendment exclusively limits states’ power to the appointment of 
presidential electors.110  The Twelfth Amendment does not mention the states 
after assigning them the power to appoint the electors on the date selected by 
Congress.111  The language provides specific details as to how the electors 
should cast their votes—without mentioning the states’ ability to remove 
them or direct who they must vote for.112  The states are notably absent from 
the process once appointment occurs because the Amendment allows electors 
“themselves” to make distinct lists, certify the votes, and transmit them to the 
Senate.113  In fact, once voting begins, there is nothing in the Amendment’s 
language that says that a state can interfere with the process.114 
The Amendment’s use of the terms “elector,” “vote,” and “ballot” could 
also be instructive in suggesting that states cannot direct who electors should 
vote for.115  Contemporaneous definitions of the words seem to reveal that 
the framers intended electors to exercise discretion in casting votes.116  
 
 107. See Utah v. Evans, 536 U.S. 452, 459 (2002) (starting with a textual analysis of the 
Constitution before considering historical practices). 
 108. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 401 (1819). 
 109. United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 731 (1931). 
 110. See Baca, 935 F.3d at 942. 
 111. See U.S. CONST. amend. XII. 
 112. See id.; Baca, 935 F.3d at 942. 
 113. See U.S. CONST. amend. XII. 
 114. See id. 
 115. Baca, 935 F.3d at 943. 
 116. One dictionary defined the term “elector” as one that “has a vote in the choice of any 
officer.” 1 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (London, J. F. & C. 
Rivington 1785).  Webster’s dictionary defined “ballot” as “to choose or vote by ballot.” NOAH 
WEBSTER, A COMPENDIOUS DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (New Haven, Sidney’s 
Press 1806); see also Baca, 935 F.3d at 943–44; Gibbons v. Ogden 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 188 
(1824) (“The enlightened patriots who framed our constitution, and the people who adopted 
it, must be understood to have employed words in their natural sense, and to have intended 
what they have said.”). 
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Further, the term “ballot” could also imply that the electors’ votes would be 
secret.117  A state’s ability to fine or remove an elector on the basis of their 
vote would require the elector’s vote to be known, which would be 
inconsistent with a secret ballot.118  As the Tenth Circuit observed, these 
definitions “have a common theme:  they all imply the right to make a choice 
or voice an individual opinion.”119 
The meaning of “elector” as someone who has the right to exercise 
discretion could further be supported by the use of the word in other parts of 
the Constitution.120  In Article I, “electors” refers to citizens voting for 
congressional representatives.121  There are no binding statutes restricting 
who these electors should vote for.122  Because the Supreme Court reads 
terms consistently throughout the Constitution, the electors referenced in the 
Twelfth Amendment may have the same discretion as the electors described 
in Article I.123 
Other phrases in the Twelfth Amendment could also imply that electors 
can exercise discretion and judgment.  The only restrictions that the Twelfth 
Amendment places on electors are that they cannot vote for two people from 
the same state for president and vice president and that they cannot hold 
federal offices of “Trust or Profit” in the federal government.124  This latter 
restriction would be unnecessary if electors merely transmitted the popular 
vote and did not exercise some independent discretion.125  The additional 
requirement that electors are to meet “in their respective States” would also 
be unnecessary if the electors functioned merely as rubber stamps.126  These 
precautions were designed to protect against corruption—an evil that could 
only arise if electors had discretion.127 
Additionally, one scholar argues that binding statutes unconstitutionally 
place another qualification on electors that is not explicitly listed in the 
Twelfth Amendment.128  In U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton,129 the 
 
 117. 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 41, at 390 (“It is 
expected and required by the Constitution, that the votes shall be secret and unknown.”). 
 118. See Robert J. Delahunty, Is the Uniform Faithful Presidential Electors Act 
Constitutional?, 2016 CARDOZO L. REV. DE·NOVO 165, 175. 
 119. Baca, 935 F.3d at 945 (analyzing multiple dictionary definitions of the words 
“elector,” “vote,” and “ballot”). 
 120. See id. 
 121. “[T]he Electors in each state shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the 
most numerous Branch of the State Legislature.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1; see also THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 57, at 349 (Alexander Hamilton) (E. H. Scott ed., 1898) (confirming that an 
“elector” meant a voter). 
 122. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964) (“The right to vote freely for the 
candidate of one’s choice is of the essence of a democratic society, and any restrictions on that 
right strike at the heart of representative government.”). 
 123. See Baca, 935 F.3d. at 946–47; see also United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 
259, 265 (1990) (interpreting a term of art in different parts of the Constitution consistently). 
 124. U.S. CONST. amend. XII. 
 125. See BENNETT, supra note 27, at 14–15. 
 126. See Delahunty, supra note 118, at 174–75. 
 127. See id. 
 128. See id. at 175–76. 
 129. 514 U.S. 779 (1995). 
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Supreme Court ruled that the Article I qualifications for election to the House 
of Representatives were exhaustive and accordingly found an Arkansas law 
that attempted to add an additional qualification unconstitutional.130  
Similarly, it is plausible to read the Twelfth Amendment restrictions on 
electors as exclusive, ruling out the possibility of an additional condition that 
electors are bound to vote for a certain candidate.131 
2.  The Supremacy Clause, the Tenth Amendment, and Constitutional 
Appointment Power Prohibit States from Controlling Electors 
Elector independence can further be supported by the Supremacy Clause 
because electors perform a federal function with which a state cannot 
interfere.132  The Supremacy Clause establishes that the Constitution and 
federal laws are supreme to state laws and cannot be controlled by the 
states.133  The Supreme Court has ruled that states cannot interfere with, 
limit, or control federal functions.134  This is true even if the person 
performing the federal function is appointed by the state.135  The Supreme 
Court has also ruled that electors perform “and discharge duties in virtue of 
authority conferred by, the Constitution of the United States.”136  Therefore, 
the only authority that would allow states to control electors would have to 
be implicitly or explicitly found in the Constitution.137 
Notably, the Tenth Amendment does not overcome the absence of any 
language in the Twelfth Amendment explicitly granting the states the right 
to control electors.138  The Tenth Amendment reserves powers not delegated 
by the Constitution to the states.139  If a power is not explicitly referenced in 
the Constitution, the silence is sometimes “interpreted as an intent that the 
relevant power be retained by the states” under the Tenth Amendment.140  
The Supreme Court, however, has ruled that the Tenth Amendment can only 
 
 130. See id. at 780 (ruling unconstitutional a law to deny ballot access to any representative 
who had served three terms in the House or two in the Senate). 
 131. See Delahunty, supra note 118, at 176. 
 132. See Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 545 (1934); Baca v. Colo. Dep’t of 
State, 935 F.3d 887, 937–38 (10th Cir. 2019), cert. granted, 140 S. Ct. 918 (Jan. 17, 2020) 
(No. 19-518) (mem.)  
 133. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; see also Baca, 935 F.3d at 938. 
 134. See Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130, 137 (1992) (“[A] federal function derived from 
the Federal Constitution . . . transcends any limitations sought to be imposed by the people of 
a State.”). 
 135. See Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221, 231 (1920) (ruling that state law cannot interfere 
with the state legislators’ role in ratifying amendments); see also Cunningham v. Neagle, 135 
U.S. 1, 75 (1890) (ruling that a federal official cannot be guilty of violating a state law for 
conduct authorized by federal law). 
 136. Burroughs, 290 U.S. at 545. 
 137. See Baca, 935 F.3d at 938. 
 138. See id. at 938–39. 
 139. See U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
 140. Baca, 935 F.3d at 938; see also U.S. CONST. amend. X (“[T]he powers not delegated 
to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the 
States respectively, or to the people.”). 
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reserve rights that existed before the Constitution was ratified.141  Because 
electors were created under the Constitution, the power to control them is not 
reserved to the states and must be expressly delegated in the Constitution.142  
In the absence of an express delegation, such a power does not exist.143 
Additionally, such a power cannot be found explicitly in the Appointments 
Clause.144  The Supreme Court’s analysis of the Appointments Clause 
recognizes that the power to appoint, control, and remove officers is based 
on the president’s obligation to take care that the laws are faithfully 
executed.145  As the Tenth Circuit observed, however, this principle extends 
solely to executive power.146  When states appoint electors, they are not 
selecting them to carry out a function for which the state is ultimately 
responsible.147  Electors are not subordinate to the state; they exercise a 
federal function when casting their ballots.148  There is no obligation in the 
Twelfth Amendment that the electors faithfully perform their function, unlike 
the obligation imposed on the president by Article II.149  Additionally, the 
power to appoint is separate from the power to control.  Before the enactment 
of the Seventeenth Amendment requiring popular election of senators, the 
state legislatures had plenary power to select senators.150  The legislatures, 
however, did not have any power to legally bind a senator to vote in a certain 
way.151  Similarly, while presidents appoint federal judges, they have no 
power to control their decisions.152  This distinction between appointment 
and control applies to electors as well.153  Therefore, states’ power to appoint 
electors does not include the power to remove or control them.154 
 
 141. See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 802 (1995). 
 142. See Baca, 935 F.3d at 939. 
 143. See id. 
 144. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; see also Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 163–
64 (1926); Baca, 935 F.3d at 940. 
 145. See Myers, 272 U.S. at 163–64; see also Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting 
Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 493 (2010) (ruling that the president is “responsib[le] to take 
care that the laws be faithfully executed” and that “the President therefore must have some 
‘power of removing those for whom he cannot continue to be responsible’” (quoting Myers, 
272 U.S. at 117)). 
 146. See Baca, 935 F.3d at 940. 
 147. See id. at 941. 
 148. See id. 
 149. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. XII, with id. art. II, § 3, cl. 1. 
 150. See id. art. I, § 3, cl. 1, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XVII. 
 151. See Saul Levmore, Precommitment Politics, 82 VA. L. REV. 567, 592 (1996). 
 152. See United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (1 Wall.) 128, 147 (1872). 
 153. See Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 230 (1952) (remarking that promises may be “legally 
unenforceable because [they are] violative of an assumed constitutional freedom of the elector 
under the Constitution, Art. II § 1, to vote as he [or she] may choose in the electoral college”). 
 154. See Baca v. Colo. Dep’t of State, 935 F.3d 887, 941 (10th Cir. 2019), cert. granted, 
140 S. Ct. 918 (Jan. 17, 2020) (No. 19-518) (mem.).  
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3.  The Original Intent of the Framers That Electors Should Exercise 
Judgment Has Been Affirmed by History 
The Electoral College was seemingly based on other models that granted 
electors independence.  One model, known to many of the framers, was the 
system instituted in Maryland in 1776, which explicitly granted electors 
independence.155  The Maryland Constitution required electors “in their 
judgment and conscience” to vote for the state senators they “believe[d] best 
qualified for the office.”156  In expressing that the framers approved of the 
Maryland system, Alexander Hamilton remarked that it was “much appealed 
to.”157  James Madison referred to Maryland’s system in arguing for the 
national system at the Constitutional Convention.158 
A reading of many of The Federalist Papers reveals that the framers 
understood electors to be independent.159  In Federalist No. 68, Hamilton 
described the process of choosing an executive that most avoided “cabal, 
intrigue, and corruption.”160  According to Hamilton, this process, described 
as an “investigation,” should be left to people “most capable of analyzing the 
qualities” of the executive “acting under circumstances favorable to 
deliberation.”161  The electors would “be most likely to possess the 
information and discernment requisite to so complicated an investigation.”162  
He expressly rejected the prospect of “any pre-established body” selecting 
the executive and insisted that the executive be chosen by people who were 
selected for the sole purpose of doing so.163 
Other writings in The Federalist Papers are consistent with Federalist No. 
68 in assuming elector independence.  In Federalist No. 60, Hamilton 
described the method for choosing the president, separate from the state 
legislatures choosing the Senate, as “by electors chosen for that purpose by 
the people.”164  Hamilton anticipated that the two methods would be different 
in that state legislatures would not choose the president by “bound proxies” 
in the form of binding statutes.165  In Federalist No. 64, John Jay described 
electors as “the most enlightened and respectable citizens” and noted that 
they would possess “extensive and accurate information relative to men and 
characters” so as to have “equal marks of discretion and discernment.”166 
 
 155. See Delahunty, supra note 118, at 171–72. 
 156. MD. CONST. of 1776 art. XVIII. 
 157. See 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 41, at 289. 
 158. See generally JAMES MADISON, Observations on Jefferson’s Draft of a Constitution 
for Virginia, in 1 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 649 (Hutchinson et al. eds., 1962). 
 159. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 971 (1997) (declaring that The Federalist 
Papers are one of the most important sources for interpreting the original intent of the 
Constitution). 
 160. THE FEDERALIST NO. 68, supra note 37, at 411. 
 161. Id. at 410. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. THE FEDERALIST NO. 60, at 366 (Alexander Hamilton) (E. H. Scott ed., 1898). 
 165. See Baca v. Colo. Dep’t of State, 935 F.3d 887, 952–53 (10th Cir. 2019), cert. granted, 
140 S. Ct. 918 (Jan. 17, 2020) (No. 19-518) (mem.).  
 166. THE FEDERALIST NO. 64, at 389 (John Jay) (E. H. Scott ed., 1898). 
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In the ratification debate around the country, there were many framers that, 
when referring to presidential electors, considered them independent.167  
John Dickinson, an influential framer in Pennsylvania, in his “Fabius” letters 
supporting ratification of the Constitution, described electors’ roles in a way 
consistent with elector independence.168  Roger Sherman, another influential 
framer in Connecticut, wrote that the president would be “reelected as often 
as the electors shall think fit.”169  In other ratifying conventions around the 
country, many supporters and opponents of the Constitution thought of the 
electors as independent and explained that the electors would choose the 
president.170  While the statements of the framers themselves have merit, the 
affirmation by constitutional scholar and Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story 
reveals an acceptance that the framers understood electors to be 
independent.171 
Based on the first few elections, the public and the framers assumed elector 
independence.  In the first election, there was little debate that George 
Washington would be chosen, but Hamilton realized that the Constitution 
allowed electors to vote for two people for president.172  Since Hamilton 
believed that this provision would result in a tie, he went around the country 
convincing some electors to vote just for Washington.173  Using Hamilton’s 
actions as an example, in 1800, Aaron Burr tried to persuade electors to vote 
only for him.174  Additionally, some early candidates for elector took the 
 
 167. See KURODA, supra note 36, at 19, 21.  In assuming elector independence, some of the 
framers argued that the requirement that electors can only vote for one candidate from their 
states “was a constraint on the free exercise of judgment.” Id. at 19.  Others described the 
electors as “[i]ndependent and free from undue influence.” Id. at 21. 
 168. 2 JOHN DICKINSON, The Letters of Fabius, in THE POLITICAL WRITINGS OF JOHN 
DICKINSON 67, 85 (Wilmington, Bonsal & Niles 1801) (“The electors may throw away their 
votes, mark, with public disappointment, some person improperly favoured by them, or justly 
revering the duties of their office, dedicate their votes to the best interest of their country.”). 
 169.  A Citizen of New Haven, Observations on the New Federal Constitution, CONN. 
COURANT, Jan. 7, 1788, reprinted in 3 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF 
THE CONSTITUTION:  CONNECTICUT 524, 524 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1978). 
 170. For example, James Wilson stated that the electors would be free from corruption, 
implying that they would be independent free agents. See Convention of Pennsylvania, in 2 
THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTION 412, 473–74 (Washington, Jonathan Elliot 1836) (statement of James Wilson). 
 171. Justice Story observed “that in no respect have the enlarged and liberal views of the 
framers of the constitution, and the expectations of the public, when it was adopted, been so 
completely frustrated, as in the practical operation of the system, so far as relates to the 
independence of the electors in the electoral colleges.” See STORY, supra note 32, § 1463.  
Justice Story’s Commentaries have been informative on issues of constitutional interpretation. 
See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 799 (1995). 
 172. See BENNETT, supra note 27, at 21. 
 173. Hamilton wrote that “[e]verybody is aware of that defect in the constitution which 
renders it possible that the man intended for Vice President may in fact turn up President.” Id. 
 174. Conflicting accounts say that Burr possibly attempted to convince electors in New 
Jersey, New York, and South Carolina to switch their votes to him. See JAMES CHEETHAM, 
VIEW OF THE POLITICAL CONDUCT OF AARON BURR 44 (New York, Denniston & Cheetham 
1802); see also CHARLES A. O’NEIL, THE AMERICAN ELECTORAL SYSTEM 84 (New York, G. 
P. Putnam’s Sons 1887). 
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view that they would be entitled to exercise judgment in casting their 
ballots.175 
The new process designed under the Twelfth Amendment did nothing to 
change these early assumptions and practices.176  Additionally, many 
comments during the ratification debate of the Twelfth Amendment suggest 
that electors could exercise discretion.  Many members of Congress referred 
to electors making choices and to the criteria they could use in making those 
choices.177  Some members believed that electors had a duty to vote for the 
most qualified person.178  Members mentioned the risk of electors being 
bribed or enticed to vote for a candidate who might not be the best 
candidate.179  One congressman even suggested that electors be given a 
second chance to vote if no majority was reached as an alternative to having 
the House decide the election.180  Taken together, these statements suggest a 
prevailing sentiment that electors could exercise discretion in casting their 
ballots. 
Congress reaffirmed this sentiment more than one hundred years later with 
the ratification and implementation of the Twenty-Third Amendment, which 
granted the District of Columbia electors equal to the number granted to the 
least populous state.181  Though there was no mention of elector 
independence in the House and Senate during the ratification of the Twenty-
Third Amendment, two representatives confirmed that its language closely 
mirrors the language of the Twelfth Amendment, which suggests that 
Congress wanted it to have the same meaning.182  Furthermore, even though 
Congress passed a binding statute, representatives have treated the statute 
merely as “a strong moral suasion . . . [with] no legal effect.”183 
 
 175. In 1792, electors in North Carolina and Virginia met and debated the merits of two 
presidential candidates. See GEORGE C. EDWARDS III, WHY THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE IS BAD 
FOR AMERICA 19 (2004). 
 176. Congress was more concerned with electors’ strategic voting inverting the presidential 
and vice-presidential candidates, which was a real worry based on the accounts from the 1796 
and 1800 elections. See BENNETT, supra note 27, at 27; see also 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 87, 98, 
186 (1803). 
 177. See 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 736 (statement of Rep. Holland) (stating that electors 
“exercis[e] their rationality as to the application of either person to any specific office”). 
 178. See, e.g., id. at 709 (statement of Rep. Lowndes) (preferring electors to vote for “men 
of high character”); id. at 752 (statement of Rep. Griswold) (stating that electors have “the 
great and solemn duty . . . to give their votes for two men who shall be best qualified”). 
 179. See, e.g., id. at 174 (statement of Sen. Tracy) (worrying that “by the force of intrigue 
and faction, the Electors may be induced to scatter their votes”); id. at 692 (statement of Rep. 
Purviance) (fearing that, eventually, electors could be bought “by promises or ample 
compensation”). 
 180. See id. at 132–33 (statement of Sen. Hillhouse). 
 181. U.S. CONST. amend. XXIII. 
 182. See 106 CONG. REC. 12,553, 12,558, 12,571 (1960). 
 183. See To Amend the Act of August 12, 1955, Relating to Elections in the District of 
Columbia:  Hearing on H.R. 5955 Before the H.R. Subcomm. No. 3 of the Comm. on the D.C., 
87th Cong. 133 (1961) (statement of Rep. Huddleston).  The law provides no legal 
consequences but requires that an elector must “take an oath or solemnly affirm that he or she 
will vote for the candidates of the party he or she has been nominated to represent, and it shall 
be his or her duty to vote in such a manner in the electoral college.” D.C. CODE § 1-
1001.08(g)(2) (2020).  In 2000, Congress declined to enforce this binding statute when one of 
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Congress has also never failed to count a faithless elector and has only 
debated the issue once.184  In 1969, six senators and thirty-seven 
representatives objected to a North Carolina vote for George Wallace even 
though Richard Nixon won the state’s popular vote.185  There was an 
extensive debate, but many members of both houses thought that electors 
were independent.186  The House voted 228 to 170 and the Senate voted 58 
to 33 to accept the vote.187  On many occasions, Congress has affirmed 
elector independence through its statements, its inability to pass any 
amendments or legislation, and its inaction in faithless elector scenarios.188 
B.  The Constitutionality of Binding Statutes 
This section presents the main argument that binding statutes are 
constitutional because a state has plenary authority over its electors.  The 
historical usage of this state authority and the practical implications of the 
Electoral College support this understanding. 
1.  Nothing in the Twelfth Amendment Prohibits Binding Statutes 
Nothing in the text of the Twelfth Amendment suggests that electors have 
the discretion to vote without limitation by the state.189  For primary 
elections, the Supreme Court, in Ray, explicitly rejected “the argument that 
the Twelfth Amendment demands absolute freedom for the elector to vote 
his own choice, uninhibited by a pledge” because of the “long-continued 
practical interpretation of the constitutional propriety” of pledges.190  While 
the Court left open the question of whether pledges are enforceable under the 
Twelfth Amendment, nothing in the Ray decision suggests that pledges 
would not be.191 
 
its electors abstained from voting. See Brief for Appellants at 48, Baca v. Colo. Dep’t of State, 
935 F.3d 887 (10th Cir. 2019), cert. granted, 140 S. Ct. 918 (Jan. 17, 2020) (No. 19-518) 
(mem.). 
 184. See Electoral College, supra note 17; see also 163 CONG. REC. H185–89 (daily ed. 
Jan. 6, 2017) (counting the faithless votes from 2016). 
 185. See generally 115 CONG. REC. 146 (1969). 
 186. See, e.g., id. at 148 (statement of Rep. McColloch) (“[T]he electors are constitutionally 
free and independent in choosing the President and Vice President.”); id. at 157 (statement of 
Rep. Poff) (“However, this language [of Article II, § 1, cl. 2] does not empower the States to 
deprive electors, once appointed, of their free choice in the electoral college.”); id. at 203–04 
(statement of Sen. Ervin) (stating that the Constitution makes clear that Congress cannot “take 
what was an ethical obligation and convert it into a constitutional obligation”). 
 187. See id. at 170, 246. 
 188. See PEIRCE & LONGLEY, supra note 46, at 131 (stating that Congress has offered over 
513 amendments regarding the Electoral College, but only one—the Twelfth Amendment—
passed). 
 189. See In re Guerra, 441 P.3d 807, 814 (Wash. 2019), cert. granted sub nom. Chiafalo v. 
Washington, 140 S. Ct. 918 (Jan. 17, 2020) (No. 19-465) (mem.). 
 190. Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 228–29 (1952). 
 191. See In re Guerra, 441 P.3d at 816; see also Koller v. Brown, 224 F. Supp. 3d 871, 
878–79 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (“Though the constitutionality of general election pledges for 
electors was left undecided in Ray, it is possible if not likely the Court would apply the same 
realistic approach when examining state-imposed restrictions on presidential electors.”). 
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Further, the notion that the term “ballot” suggests that electors have a right 
to secrecy and discretion is disputable.192  Since the Twelfth Amendment 
requires that electors vote distinctly for president and vice president and 
prohibits them from voting for two candidates from the same state, 
anonymity would be impossible because Congress, when counting the votes, 
would have no way of knowing whether the elector adhered to these rules.193  
Additionally, historical practices of both the states and Congress provide 
ample evidence for rejecting the assumption that the “ballots” are secret.194 
2.  States Have Broad Powers to Appoint Electors 
While it is undisputed that electors perform a federal function, they do so 
on behalf of the states that appoint them.195  Although the Supreme Court 
acknowledged in Burroughs that electors perform a federal function, the 
Court also recognized that federal authority was limited in interfering “with 
the power of a state to appoint electors or the manner in which their 
appointment shall be made.”196  In In re Green,197 the Court stated that “[t]he 
sole function of the presidential electors is to cast, certify and transmit the 
vote of the State for President and Vice President of the nation.”198  Further, 
when the Supreme Court has struck down state interference with federal 
functions under the Supremacy Clause, it did so because the actors were 
acting under federal authority.199  In contrast, electors “act by authority of 
the state that in turn receives its authority from the Federal Constitution.”200  
The Supreme Court in Ray confirmed that the Constitution grants broad 
authority to the states under the Twelfth Amendment.201 
The states’ power to appoint electors is also plenary and exclusive.202  The 
Twelfth Amendment’s language provides that the state legislature may 
 
 192. In re Guerra, 441 P.3d at 816 n.8. 
 193. Brief for Derek T. Muller as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party at 4–5, Baca v. 
Colo. Dep’t of State, 935 F.3d 887 (10th Cir. 2019), cert. granted, 140 S. Ct. 918 (Jan. 17, 
2020) (No. 19-518) (mem.) [hereinafter Muller Brief]; see also ROBERT M. HARDAWAY, THE 
ELECTORAL COLLEGE AND THE CONSTITUTION:  THE CASE FOR PRESERVING FEDERALISM 57–58 
(1994) (concluding that the Constitution does not require secret ballots). 
 194. See Muller Brief, supra note 193, at 6; Natalie Brand, Washington State Electors Vote 
for Clinton, Powell, Faith Spotted Eagle, KING5 NEWS (Dec. 20, 2016), 
https://www.king5.com/article/news/politics/washington-state-electors-vote-for-clinton-
powell-faith-spotted-eagle/281-373558515 [https://perma.cc/5XCP-ARDA]. 
 195. See In re Green, 134 U.S. 377, 378–80 (1890). 
 196. Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 544 (1934). 
 197. 134 U.S. 377 (1890). 
 198. Id. at 379. 
 199. See, e.g., Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130, 137 (1992) (“[A] federal function derived 
from the Federal Constitution . . . transcends any limitations sought to be imposed by the 
people of a State.”); Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221, 230 (1920). 
 200. Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 224–25 (1952). 
 201. Id.; see also Burroughs, 290 U.S. at 544; McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 35 (1892). 
 202. See Ray, 343 U.S. at 227; McPherson, 146 U.S. at 35; see also Williams v. Rhodes, 
393 U.S. 23, 34 (1968) (stating that states have “broad powers to regulate voting, which may 
include laws relating to the qualification and functions of electors”). 
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appoint electors “in such manner as the Legislature thereof may direct.”203  
Therefore, this power to appoint could encompass the power to remove.  If it 
did not, then the states would have no ability to enforce their authority over 
their electors.204  Additionally, the analogy comparing electors to federal 
judges or senators (appointed by the state legislatures before the Seventeenth 
Amendment) is seemingly incorrect.  Judges and senators are federal officers 
protected by specific constitutional provisions against removal or the 
attachment of certain conditions.205 
The ability to add qualifications or conditions to electors may also be 
permitted under the Constitution.  Nothing in the Constitution prohibits states 
from attaching a condition or qualification to the appointment of electors.206  
In fact, the Supreme Court, in McPherson, determined that states have the 
power to “define the method of effecting the object” of appointing the 
electors.207  Because the states have this exclusive power to appoint, they are 
permitted to attach conditions, such as those binding electors to the state’s 
popular vote.208  Further, even the Tenth Circuit originally rejected this 
argument by concluding that “a statutory requirement to vote in a certain 
way . . . is more in the way of a duty than a qualification.”209 
3.  An Inconsistent Viewpoint Among the Framers and a Consistent 
Understanding in History Suggest That States Can Bind Electors 
Since the framers did not contemplate the modern-day concepts of political 
parties, national primary campaigns, pledges, or faithless electors, they never 
had reason to impose any restrictions on states binding their electors.210  
Further, such contemplation did not take place at any point during the 
Constitutional Convention, where an issue like this would have been 
raised.211 
 
 203. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2; see also 115 CONG. REC. 163 (1969) (statement of Rep. 
Fraser) (“This language is a general grant of power, broadly drawn, which does not 
circumscribe the procedures under which the States may choose electors.”). 
 204. See Burnap v. United States, 252 U.S. 512, 515 (1990) (“The power to remove is, in 
the absence of any statutory provision to the contrary, an incident of the power to appoint.”); 
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 147 (1803) (“[E]very right, when withheld, must 
have a remedy . . . .”). 
 205. Brief for Appellee at 44, Baca v. Colo. Dep’t of State, 935 F.3d 887 (10th Cir. 2019), 
cert. granted, 140 S. Ct. 918 (Jan. 17, 2020) (No. 19-518) (mem.). 
 206. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XII. 
 207. See McPherson, 146 U.S. 1 at 27. 
 208. See Beverly J. Ross & William Josephson, The Electoral College and the Popular 
Vote, 12 J.L. & POL. 665, 678 (1996) (“The states’ constitutional power to appoint electors 
would appear to include the power to bind them.”). 
 209. Baca v. Hickenlooper, No. 16-cv-02986-WYD-NYW, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 23391, 
at *13–14 (10th Cir. Dec. 21, 2016). 
 210. See Vasan Kesavan, Is the Electoral Count Act Unconstitutional?, 80 N.C. L. REV. 
1653, 1658 (2002). 
 211. See HARDAWAY, supra note 193, at 85.  Robert M. Hardaway further argues that “[i]t 
was doubtless envisioned that the entire process of electing electors and determining their 
characteristics would be an evolutionary one.” Id. 
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During the ratifying conventions and the debates about the Constitution, 
the framers expressed contradictory views on the role of presidential 
electors.212  Despite the strong suggestion that Hamilton intended electors to 
be independent, he also expressed in Federalist No. 68 the idea that “the 
people should operate in the choice” of the president.213  Additionally, in 
Federalist No. 45, James Madison wrote that the state legislatures “must in 
all cases have a great share in [the president’s] appointment, and will, 
perhaps, in most cases, of themselves determine it.”214  Along with Madison, 
other framers such as James Wilson, Gouverneur Morris, and Roger Sherman 
also expressed the sentiment that the president would be elected by the 
people, which seemingly contradicts the belief that electors would be 
independent.215 
The experience during the first years of the Electoral College, before the 
ratification of the Twelfth Amendment, suggests that electors did not have 
discretion.216  As early as the first election, electors made pledges to specific 
candidates and were not known to exhibit absolute discretion in voting for 
the president.217  In subsequent elections, the public understood electors to 
be pledged to a certain party and expected them to support their 
candidates.218 
 
 212. See Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 237 (1963) (Brennan, J., 
concurring) (writing that conflicting statements on both sides of an issue cannot be readily 
relied on). 
 213. THE FEDERALIST NO. 68, supra note 37, at 410.  Some commentators have explained 
that Hamilton sometimes expressed contradictory views based on the audience he was trying 
to persuade to ratify the Constitution. See HARDAWAY, supra note 193, at 85–86. 
 214. THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 287 (James Madison) (E. H. Scott ed., 1898). 
 215. See BENNETT, supra note 27, at 15–16.  For example, on January 7, 1787, Roger 
Sherman wrote in The Connecticut Courant that the president would be appointed “in a 
manner . . . wisely adapted to concentrate the general voice of the people” and that the 
president “depends upon the people.” A Citizen of New Haven, supra note 169, at 532.  
Another example occurred when Hamilton advocated for ratification in New York, stating that 
“[t]he legislatures are to provide the mode of electing the President, and must have a great 
influence over the electors.” Convention of New York, in THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE 
CONVENTIONS, ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 170, at 211, 304 
(statement of Alexander Hamilton). 
 216. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 980 (1991) (expressing the idea that the 
actions of some of the framers shortly after the Constitution’s ratification are strong evidence 
of constitutional meaning and intent). 
 217. Most electors informally pledged loyalty to a certain party.  For example, a 
Pennsylvania Federalist slate of electors pledged to vote for someone—presumably John 
Adams—who would continue the policies of George Washington. O’NEIL, supra note 174, at 
65.  This slate produced the nation’s first “faithless elector,” Samuel Miles, who was pressured 
to fulfill the will of the people of Pennsylvania who voted for Thomas Jefferson. See id.  
Reacting to Miles’s decision to ignore his pledge, a critic in a Philadelphia newspaper wrote, 
“What, do I chuse [sic] Samuel Miles to determine for me whether John Adams or Thomas 
Jefferson shall be President?  No!  I chuse [sic] him to act, not think.” BENNETT, supra note 
27, at 102; see also Baca v. Colo. Dep’t of State, 935 F.3d 887, 948 (10th Cir. 2019), cert. 
granted, 140 S. Ct. 918 (Jan. 17, 2020) (No. 19-518) (mem.).  Another newspaper, the New 
York Diary, expressed disappointment that the election was not a “decided expression of the 
public voice” and that a uniform rule was needed. See O’NEIL, supra note 174, at 66. 
 218. See McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 36 (1892) (“[E]xperience soon demonstrated 
that . . . [electors] were so chosen simply to register the will of the appointing power in respect 
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One reason that the public expected electors to transmit the state’s popular 
vote was the widespread use of the “short-form” presidential ballot.219  A 
short-form ballot is a ballot that only contains the names of the presidential 
and vice-presidential candidates, excluding the names of the electors.220  A 
vote for the party’s candidates is a vote for that party’s electors.221  First 
created by Nebraska in 1917, the development of these types of ballots 
simplified the ballot for the average voter.222  The Supreme Court, in Ray, 
recognized this reality and determined that this practice weighed “heavily in 
considering the constitutionality of a pledge.”223  Since most states do not 
print the names of electors on the ballots, voters are choosing unknown 
people who they expect to vote for their party’s nominee.224 
As Congress debated the Twelfth Amendment, most congressmen knew 
that pledges were being used during elections and did not include anything 
in the Amendment to prohibit the practice.225  One congressman remarked 
that “[w]ise and virtuous as were the members of the Convention, experience 
has shown that the [Electoral College] therein adopted cannot be carried into 
operation” and “[t]herefore, practically, the very thing is adopted, intended 
by this amendment.”226  Many other statements from legislators also 
indicated that electors were agents of the people and did not have the ability 
to exercise discretion.227  At the time the Twelfth Amendment was ratified, 
there were also state laws that replaced or fined electors who failed to carry 
out their duties.228  Despite substantial debate, the Twelfth Amendment did 
 
of a particular candidate.”); see also 115 CONG. REC. 149 (1969) (statement of Rep. Celler) 
(“This traditional ministerial function of the electors has become sacred.”).  James Russell 
Lowell, an elector in 1876, said of his decision to vote for Rutherford B. Hayes and not Samuel 
Tilden: 
I have no choice, and am bound in honor to vote for Hayes, as the people who chose 
me expected me to do.  They did not choose me because they had confidence in my 
judgment, but because they thought they knew what that judgment would be.  It is 
a plain question of trust.  
BENNETT, supra note 27, at 103. 
 219. See HARDAWAY, supra note 193, at 17. 
 220. See Spencer D. Albright, The Presidential Short Ballot, 34 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 955, 
955 (1940). 
 221. See N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 12-100 (McKinney 2020). 
 222. See Albright, supra note 220, at 956, 958. 
 223. Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 230 (1952). 
 224. See The Electoral College, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Jan. 6, 2020), https:// 
www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/the-electoral-college.aspx#2016%20dates 
[https://perma.cc/ST6S-8VXJ]. 
 225. See U.S. CONST. amend. XII. 
 226. 11 ANNALS OF CONG. 1289 (1802) (statement of Rep. Mitchell). 
 227. See 115 CONG. REC. 162 (1969) (statement of Sen. Breckinridge) (“If any principle is 
more sacred and all-important for free government it is that elections should be as direct as 
possible . . . .  And if it were practicable to act without any agents in the choice, that would be 
preferable even to the choice by Electors.”); id. at 163 (statement of Rep. Clopton) (“The 
Electors are the organs, who, acting from a certain and unquestioned knowledge . . . select and 
announce those particular citizens, and affix to them by their votes and evidence of the degree 
of public confidence which is bestowed upon them.”). 
 228. See Muller Brief, supra note 193, at 16. 
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not address whether these pledges were prohibited or whether states were 
restricted in enacting these types of laws.229 
Congress has also given the states broad power to appoint their electors.  
Congress has passed legislation giving the states exclusive power to make a 
“final determination” over “any controversy or contest” over the appointment 
of an elector.230  Additionally, when Congress passed the Twenty-Third 
Amendment, it also passed a law that binds the District of Columbia’s 
electors to the district’s popular vote.231  One court reasoned that this 
indicates that Congress explicitly favors binding an elector’s vote to the 
popular vote of the state.232 
Additionally, while it is true that Congress has never failed to count a 
faithless vote, it is also true that Congress has never failed to count a vote 
that was bound by state law.233  Congress has objected to electoral votes 
numerous times in the past, but no electoral votes have ever been 
overturned.234  In the 1969 debate over the North Carolina elector who voted 
for George Wallace over Richard Nixon, Congress ultimately counted the 
single Wallace vote but did so in large part because North Carolina had no 
binding statute.235 
III.  ALL POLITICS (SHOULD BE) LOCAL 
The Supreme Court’s narrow ruling in Ray, which limited its decision to 
primary elections, led the Tenth Circuit to override decades of practice and 
state law.236  This Part advocates for the Washington State Supreme Court’s 
position that states have exclusive control over electors and that binding 
statutes are constitutional.  It analyzes the strongest arguments for this 
position and addresses certain arguments not discussed by the courts.  
Finally, it implores the Supreme Court to definitively rule on the issue and 
discusses the effects that such a ruling might have on future elections. 
 
 229. See United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 732 (1931) (“The fact that an instrument 
drawn with such meticulous care . . . does not contain any such limiting phrase . . . is 
persuasive evidence that no qualification was intended.”). 
 230. See 3 U.S.C. § 5 (2018) (stating that state laws that make a “final determination of any 
controversy or contest concerning” electors are “conclusive, and shall govern in the 
counting”). 
 231. See D.C. CODE § 1-1001.08(g)(2) (2020). 
 232. See Baca v. Hickenlooper, No. 16-cv-02986-WYD-NYW, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
177991, at *7 (D. Colo. Dec. 21, 2016) (“Federal law supports the notion that the State’s 
requirement that presidential electors pledge to vote for a particular candidate, in conformity 
with State law, is constitutional.”). 
 233. See, e.g., 163 CONG. REC. H185–89 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 2017). 
 234. See generally 115 CONG. REC. 146 (1969) (debating the electoral vote in North 
Carolina). 
 235. See, e.g., id. (statement of Rep. Jonas) (“[T]he responsibility rests on the State of North 
Carolina and the other States of the Union to make it impossible in the future for the election 
of a President of the United States to turn on the whim or predilection of individual electors.”); 
id. at 149 (statement of Rep. McColloch) (“But what law—State or Federal—did he violate?  
I find none.”). 
 236. See supra Parts I.D, II.A. 
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A.  More Than Two Hundred Years of Practical Experience Favors State 
Control over Electors and Binding Statutes 
The universal and unchallenged use of the presidential short-form ballot is 
a strong indication that electors should not be independent.237  Since 1860, 
states have chosen to appoint their electors according to the will of the state’s 
popular vote.238  With the advent of the short-form presidential ballot in 
1917, excluding the names of electors from the ballot further supports the 
argument that electors cannot have the independence to choose whomever 
they want for president.239  Most voters assume that they are casting their 
votes for the candidates named on the ballot.  No state ballot indicates that 
citizens are actually casting votes for electors who may ignore their votes and 
choose someone else.  The concept of the unknown elector strongly suggests 
that electors simply exist to register the will of the popular vote.  Allowing 
independent electors would thus be tantamount to a fraud upon the voter 
because their vote could be ignored in favor of another candidate.  Voters 
likely do not know who the electors are.  Additionally, because electors are 
relatively unknown, they cannot be held accountable by the voting public like 
other elected officials.240  The unchallenged use of the short-ballot 
perpetuates the understanding that electors should follow the popular vote.241 
Further, the long-standing interpretation of an elector’s role by the framers, 
Congress, and the courts gives no indication that electors can vote contrary 
to state law or the popular vote.  During the Constitutional Convention, the 
framers did not discuss an elector’s independent role.242  Afterward, many 
framers disagreed as to electors’ exact role.243  Scholars often cite Federalist 
No. 68 as evidence that the framers understood electors to be independent.244  
This, however, is the work of one framer—Alexander Hamilton—who was 
known to tailor his writing to its intended audience.245  Other framers, such 
as James Madison, James Wilson, and Roger Sherman, argued that the 
president should ultimately be chosen by the people, contradicting their own 
previous statements.246  The opinion of one framer in one piece of writing 
should not be taken as authoritative proof of the framers’ collective intent 
where contradictory statements by other framers exist.247 
 
 237. See supra notes 221–24 and accompanying text. 
 238. South Carolina was the last state to allow its state legislature to choose its electors, 
permitting this activity until 1860. See PEIRCE & LONGLEY, supra note 46, at 248. 
 239. See supra notes 221–24 and accompanying text. 
 240. See supra notes 221–24 and accompanying text. 
 241. See supra notes 221–24 and accompanying text. 
 242. See supra Part I.B; see also supra notes 210–11 and accompanying text.  Notably, 
Alexander Hamilton never expressed the view that electors should be independent during the 
Convention. See HARDAWAY, supra note 193, at 85. 
 243. See supra notes 212–18 and accompanying text. 
 244. See supra notes 159–63 and accompanying text. 
 245. See supra note 213 and accompanying text. 
 246. See supra note 215 and accompanying text. 
 247. See supra note 212 and accompanying text.  Hardaway presents an interesting 
argument undermining the idea that one framer’s view on a constitutional issue should be the 
authoritative source. See HARDAWAY, supra note 193, at 85–86.  He explains that Hamilton 
also advocated that the president should be elected for life and that if reformers were to 
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In the early years of the United States, electors were not known to have 
independence.  In the first election, Alexander Hamilton, for political 
reasons, tried to persuade electors to cast a single vote for George 
Washington instead of casting votes for both Washington and Adams.248  
While this may suggest that Hamilton understood electors to be free agents, 
it may indicate more significantly that he did not actually expect electors to 
use their own judgment.  In fact, he did not want the electors to extensively 
debate the merits of each candidate.249  Notably, in Federalist No. 68, 
Hamilton explained that electors should be “free from any sinister bias” and 
that they were to choose a president after a thorough “investigation.”250  
Hamilton’s actions undermined his words; there was no investigation here. 
When Congress debated the Twelfth Amendment, many of the original 
framers then living did not discuss the independence of electors, even though 
pledges and political parties were already an important part of elections at 
the time.251  These framers extensively debated revising Article II’s provision 
that electors must vote for two candidates for president but did not debate 
explicitly restricting a state’s broad authority over electors.252  Congress 
ratified the Twelfth Amendment merely as a bookkeeping provision to 
eliminate the confusion experienced during the 1800 election, when the 
House went through thirty-six rounds of voting to choose the president.253  
They did not write anything into the Constitution that prohibited these 
pledges, despite knowing of their existence and their widespread usage.254 
Congress has the exclusive right to object to an electoral vote, and courts 
should not interfere with Congress’s constitutional right to dispute electoral 
votes.255  Congress has historically assumed that states have exclusive 
authority over electors and that electors’ votes should mirror the popular 
votes of their states.256  In the 1969 debate over a faithless elector in North 
Carolina, Congress counted the faithless vote.257  This singular vote, 
however, should not suggest direct congressional acceptance of elector 
independence over state authority.  In voting to count the faithless vote, many 
members cited North Carolina’s lack of a law binding its electors.258  If there 
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had been a law, it might have changed their vote.259  Additionally, some 
members agreed that states can enact laws to prevent faithless votes.260 
In 2017, many legislators attempted to object to electoral votes from 
different states, but Congress did not debate them.261  Despite the 
controversies regarding binding statutes in California, Colorado, Minnesota, 
and Washington, no representative raised any objections to these electoral 
votes.262  While it is true that Congress has never rejected a faithless elector’s 
vote, it is equally true that the only time a state enforced its binding statute 
and removed a faithless voter (which is what happened in Colorado in 2016), 
Congress nevertheless accepted that vote.263 
Congress also explicitly approved of binding statutes when it enacted the 
District of Columbia’s binding statute after the Twenty-Third 
Amendment.264  Even though there is no enforcement mechanism in the 
binding law, the enactment of the law reveals that Congress wants electors to 
manifest the will of a state’s popular vote.265  Despite one representative’s 
statement that the law would only have “moral suasion,” the statute is an 
implicit approval of the long-standing practice of binding statutes.266 
Historically, courts have also granted states exclusive authority over their 
electors and have favored voters over elector independence.267  In Ray, while 
ruling on pledges in primaries, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that 
the Twelfth Amendment demanded absolute freedom for electors.268  The 
Court also ruled that the Constitution did not grant a right for electors to vote 
based on their individual preferences.269  In his dissent, Justice Jackson 
ignored the framers’ numerous inconsistent statements about elector 
independence and oversimplified the Constitution in stating that it implied 
elector independence.270  While he was correct that custom is not sufficient 
authority to amend the Constitution, a “constitutional generality” or 
vagueness, such as the Twelfth Amendment’s language describing the 
elector’s role, should be interpreted with an eye toward years of political 
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practice.271  Justice Jackson also considerably overstated the majority’s 
ruling as “entrench[ing] the worst features of the system.”272  The majority’s 
decision was simply a practical remedy for a quirk in the electoral system 
that was seemingly not going to be fixed by constitutional amendment or by 
Congress.  Additionally, nearly all federal and state courts before and after 
Ray have consistently upheld the constitutionality of binding statutes.273  In 
2019, however, the Tenth Circuit overturned Colorado’s binding law and 
became the first court in history to strike down any binding statute, despite 
the long history of explicit approval of Congress and the framers.274 
B.  How Binding Statutes Address Constitutional Inconsistences and 
Concerns 
A state’s authority over its electors is exclusive and comprehensive.275  
Nothing in the Constitution prohibits the states from establishing elector 
pledges or removing an elector who refuses to comply with the conditions of 
his or her appointment.276  The Twelfth Amendment restricts an elector in 
two ways:  (1) an elector must vote separately for president and vice president 
and (2) the two candidates must be from different states.277  These 
limitations, however, are not meant to be exhaustive because the states have 
plenary power over elector appointment.278  The two leading Supreme Court 
cases that restrict the addition of conditions not explicitly expressed in the 
Constitution are not applicable to electors since the cases dealt with elected 
officials; electors are distinguishable because they are appointed.279  
Furthermore, if the framers had wanted to prohibit binding statutes, they 
could have explicitly stated as much in the Constitution.  The framers were 
aware of the pre-Constitution Maryland model, under which electors had 
complete discretion in choosing state senators.280  Had the framers intended 
electors to have complete discretion, they could have used the explicit 
Maryland language. 
Additionally, binding statutes directly address some of the concerns the 
framers had during the convention.  In the debate regarding the selection of 
the president, the framers were concerned that the legislative branch would 
have too much control over the executive branch.281  These concerns led the 
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framers to substitute the Electoral College for their original proposal, in 
which the legislators would directly choose the president.282  Binding statutes 
do not direct an elector to vote for a specific candidate or party.  They direct 
an elector to vote based on the state’s popular vote.  Thus, the effect of the 
binding statutes is to have the voters of the state, not the state legislatures, 
choose the president.  The fear that the executive would be unduly influenced 
by the legislators is unfounded since these laws place the ultimate authority 
with the people of the state.283 
Binding statutes also diminish corruption concerns.  In Federalist No. 68, 
Hamilton endorsed the practice of choosing an executive that would most 
avoid “cabal, intrigue, and corruption.”284  If electors were not bound by state 
law, they would certainly be more susceptible to corruption.285  What would 
stop an ambitious losing presidential candidate from bribing electors to 
ignore their pledges and vote for them?  Such a distressing scenario is not so 
far-fetched.  For example, before the election in 2000, both Al Gore and 
George W. Bush developed a strategy to persuade electors to vote against 
their state’s popular vote.286  Electors are less likely to experience nefarious 
or political influence with binding statutes in place because these laws 
institute legal mechanisms preventing an elector from pursuing selfish goals. 
While a strict interpretation of the use of the term “electors” in Article II 
of the Constitution favors treating them the same as the “electors” referenced 
in Article I, certain facts suggest that Article II electors should not be treated 
the same way.287  Article I electors (or the general public) vote for Congress, 
and no one has ever disputed the unconstitutionality of laws directing how 
these “electors” can vote.  Article I electors, however, cast their votes on 
secret ballots, which would be impossible for Article II electors based on 
procedure.288  Electors cannot vote for two candidates from the same state.289  
The only way to enforce this provision is to look at each elector’s ballot to 
ensure that they have complied.290  Furthermore, Article II electors are 
appointed by the state—as opposed to Article I electors, who constitute the 
general public.291 
C.  Too Close to Call:  Unintended Consequences and a Supreme Court 
Ruling 
Ultimately, there are only two ways to settle the issue of the 
constitutionality of elector independence and binding statutes:  a 
constitutional amendment or a Supreme Court ruling.  Because of the 
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rigorous process for amending the Constitution, the easier route would be a 
Supreme Court ruling.292  The Court will hear the Baca case on April 28, 
2020, and should issue an opinion on June 29, 2020.293  Some argue that by 
reaching an opinion in June, six months before the presidential election and 
before either party’s nominating convention, the Court will preserve its 
impartiality by resolving the issue “outside of the white-hot scrutiny of a 
contested presidential election.”294 
While this Note advocates that the Court should rule in the states’ favor, it 
acknowledges some negative effects that such a ruling could have.  If the 
Court holds binding statutes and their enforcement constitutional, a state 
could conceivably enact a law binding electors to vote for a specific party.295  
The New Jersey and New York state legislatures have already introduced 
partisan bills.296  These bills would prevent electors from voting for 
candidates who do not release copies of their recent tax returns.297  A 
favorable Supreme Court ruling could open the door to many states 
proposing similar partisan statutes. 
This Note argues, however, that slippery-slope concerns about states 
passing binding statutes motivated by partisan objectives are unfounded.  
Laws binding electors to the popular vote of a state have less nefarious 
purposes.  These laws are neutral because they are only meant to reflect the 
popular sentiment that “history has now favored the voter.”298 
Restricting an elector’s independence may also create unanticipated 
complications in the case of a candidate who dies after Election Day but 
before the electors’ meeting in December.299  Binding statutes would force 
electors into the absurd position of voting for a deceased candidate.  
Representative William Moore McCulloch expressed this concern during the 
1969 debate over the North Carolina faithless elector, saying that the 
electoral system “necessitates that the electors remain free and independent 
because the people’s choice may have died” between November and 
December.300  While resolving this concern is outside the scope of this Note, 
a ruling that would require electors to comply with binding statutes might 
pose complications.  In this regard, a ruling in the states’ favor could, 
however, force legislators to directly address the issue of a candidate’s 
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potential death—an area of presidential election law that has received little 
attention.301 
A narrow ruling by the Court could alleviate some of these concerns.  The 
Court could, for example, rule that certain binding statutes are constitutional, 
while others are not.  While some binding statutes impose penalties on 
faithless electors, most have no consequences.302  Further, the penalties for 
faithless electors differ based on the enforcement mechanisms.303  
Ultimately, the Court could tailor its ruling to the different penalties.  The old 
law in Washington that imposed a fine may be more likely to pass 
constitutional muster than the Colorado law, which removes an elector and 
cancels their vote.304  The Court could find that the Colorado law directly 
interferes with the voting process outlined in the Twelfth Amendment, while 
the old Washington law does not because it imposed a fine after voting 
ended.305  Other states might want to model their binding statutes after the 
old Washington law because the pressure of a severe fine could produce the 
same desired result as more enforcement-driven laws. 
A ruling against the states may focus attention on the shortcomings of the 
Electoral College.306  Lawrence Lessig, a Harvard professor who filed a brief 
on behalf of the electors from Washington, believes that a ruling for elector 
independence “could also convince both sides that it is finally time to step up 
and modify the Constitution to address this underlying problem.”307  Similar 
to Justice Jackson in Ray, Lessig and others who agree with his position 
believe that, if the Court ruled in favor of the states, it would only mask a 
small defect and ignore a system that is wholly wrong and in need of 
substantial reform.308  This argument, however, is too pessimistic.  A ruling 
for the states would simply affirm state authority over electors in the thirty-
two states that have binding statutes.  It is hard to fathom that such a ruling 
would silence the prominent calls to reform the Electoral College.309  
Additionally, this specific issue does not address those reformers’ main 
concerns with the Electoral College.  In fact, reform efforts are generally 
concerned with certain states’ oversized importance in general elections and 
the diminished role of other states and not with the chance that a faithless 
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vote could tip an election.310  Just in accepting the case, the Supreme Court 
has thrust the Electoral College into the spotlight in the middle of a 
presidential election and intensified calls for reform.311  A ruling that affirms 
state authority and the constitutionality of binding statutes would simply be 
a practical remedy for a quirk in the system that would have an instant impact 
on the 2020 election. 
CONCLUSION 
After the Tenth Circuit’s August 2019 decision, the constitutionality of 
binding statutes is now, for the first time, in doubt.  While a strict 
interpretation of the Constitution suggests that the elector has the freedom to 
vote independently, regardless of any state law, the immediate early usage 
and long-standing historical understanding of an elector’s role suggest the 
opposite:  binding statutes and their enforcement should be recognized as 
constitutional.  Universal acceptance of binding statutes and short-form 
ballots should overcome vague constitutional language and the framers’ 
inconsistent statements and actions. 
This major Electoral College shortcoming is in urgent need of reform.  In 
2016, seven electors cast their votes for someone other than the candidate 
they were required to vote for by law.312  A swing of that many electors could 
have changed the outcomes of five of the previous fifty-eight presidential 
elections.313  It is imperative that the Supreme Court rule on this issue and 
affirm the Washington State Supreme Court’s decision before a faithless 
elector changes the outcome of a presidential election. 
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